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1 Introduction
In 1792, the first consumer boycott was organised to
protest against the inhumane treatment of slaves in
the production of sugar in the West Indies. In his
comic novel of the time, Melincourt, Thomas Love
Peacock (1817) wrote of the trade in sugar that it was
‘economically superfluous, physically pernicious,
morally atrocious and politically abominable’. Much
the same could be said of ‘Conditional Cash Transfers’
(CCTs) today.
2 ‘Physically pernicious’
Semantically, the very label ‘conditional’ is imprecise.
The definition of what constitutes a CCT is highly
ambiguous. The World Bank (one of its champions)
defines it as follows:
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aim at
reducing poverty in the short term through cash
transfers while at the same time trying to
encourage investments into the human capital of
the next generation by making these transfers
conditional upon regular school attendance or the
regular use of preventive health care services.1
This attempts to limit CCTs to transfers that involve
human capital conditionalities, such as access to
health and education services. But a cash-for-work
scheme is equally ‘conditional’ – the transfer is
conditional upon the provision of labour. And many
other transfers may also be considered ‘conditional’ –
they depend upon a beneficiary turning up at a
particular place at a particular time to collect a food
ration, or they require a recipient to travel some
distance to exchange a voucher for agricultural inputs
in a particular retail outlet. Other transfers are
conditional on ‘passive’ characteristics of the
beneficiary: being HIV-positive, owning land, being
over 60 years old, being orphaned, having a disability.
In reality, all social transfers are conditional on
something. Even a universal fertiliser subsidy is
conditional on the beneficiary buying fertiliser. And,
taken to its logical extreme, a civil servant may be
considered the recipient of a CCT in the sense that
he or she receives a cash handout that is conditional
on a work requirement – and indeed often makes
the same complaints as any other public works
welfare recipient: the sometimes irregular receipt of
a below-market wage in exchange for a usually
pointless occupation…
3 ‘Politically abominable’
Second, the term ‘conditional’ smacks of Bretton
Woods paternalism. It is redolent of the
‘conditionalities’ imposed by IMF, World Bank and
other donors when making loans or implementing
budget support programmes, a perpetuation of the
mind-set that imposed ‘structural adjustment’ and
enforced ‘poverty reduction strategies’. It fails to
convey the sense of partnership or inclusion that
should be the basis for social protection; and it
presupposes that the nanny-state knows better than
its citizens how best to use their scant resources – a
highly dubious assumption. A much better term,
based on the concept of a mutually-agreed
partnership between beneficiaries and grant-giving
governments would be ‘compactual’ (a neologism
borrowed from the idea of a ‘social compact’,
meaning ‘an agreement … within a society to work
together for the benefit of all’.2 This has the
advantage of beginning with the letter ‘c’, thus
preserving the acronym ‘CCT’; and clearly
distinguishes such transfers from labour-based
transfers, and from other types of social transfer that
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do not require a reciprocal obligation on the part of
the beneficiary.
4 ‘Economically superfluous’
But CCTs are highly questionable from a practical
perspective in any case. Even if we accept that there
is a justification for governments ‘insisting’ that
welfare recipients fulfil certain ‘obligations’ (like
attending schools or health clinics), does it actually
work to try to force them to do so? It is true that
there is some evidence, for example from central and
south America,3 that school attendance and health
indicators improve in households that receive CCTs –
but who is to say whether this is a feature of the
‘conditionality’ rather than of the transfer itself (or
simply the fact of a predictable source of regular
income)? In the case of Oportunidades in Mexico, the
jury is still out:
Oportunidades combines three key mechanisms:
grants that increase the income of poor
households, awareness promotion that
emphasises the importance of human capital, and
conditionalities that link the two – making the
grants conditional on behaviours that reinforce
human capital development. The evaluations have
successfully demonstrated that all three of these
ingredients together can generate very positive
results. However, the studies so far have been
unable to identify which is most important – the
income, the awareness or the conditionality.
(Samson, van Niekerk and MacQuene 2006)
Another equally valid reason for observed
improvements in school attendance and health
indicators (in addition to the ‘demand-side’ effect of
the cash transfer) may well be concurrent ‘supply-
side’ measures to improve access to education and
health services, where these are already under way,
either linked to CCT programmes or independently.
For example, an evaluation of PROGRESA (now
Oportunidades) admits that:
Since these increased resources related to the
quality of services are part of the overall
PROGRESA benefit package provided, the
evaluation of the program can provide little direct
evidence on whether a demand-side intervention
is more effective (in terms of impact and/or in
terms of cost) relative to a supply-side
intervention. (Skoufias 2005)
This uncertainty over the effectiveness of
conditionality is reinforced by the fact that school
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Are there backlogs in delivering social 
services?  
Does government have strong 
administrative capacity?  
Do the poor face bottlenecks in 
accessing social services?  
Is the unemployment rate relatively 
high or low?  
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Figure 1 Criteria for choosing between conditional and unconditional transfers
attendance and health indicators also improve where
cash transfers are made unconditionally: evidence
from such schemes in Zambia (MCDSS/GTZ 2006),
Namibia (Devereux 2001) and Malawi (Devereux et al.
2006) all show significant increases in beneficiaries’
expenditure on health and education, and in the
indicators for resultant health and educational
outcomes. In South Africa, where social grants are
unconditional:
… extensive evaluations document the substantial
impact of social grants – children (particularly
girls) in households receiving grants demonstrate
better weight-for-height indicators, improved
nutrition, less hunger and better school
attendance than children in comparable
households that do not receive grants. Grant
recipient households spend a greater proportion
of their income on food and education, and less
on alcohol, tobacco and gambling than similar
households not receiving grants.
(Samson, van Niekerk and MacQuene 2006)
5 So what is the benefit of attaching
conditionality?
Again, even if such human capital conditionality were
shown to work in some environments (such as in
Latin America), it is highly unlikely that it would ever
do so elsewhere (such as in much of Africa). A strong
case can be made that CCTs only have a remote
chance of success when certain structural conditions
are met. Indeed it may be that such ‘supply-side
conditionality’ is far more significant in delivering
improved livelihood outcomes: if we want improved
school and clinic attendance by the poor, then the
best way would be to improve primary education
and health services close to where poor people live.
For example, a recent analysis4 by the Economic
Policy Research Institute in South Africa suggested
five criteria for choosing between conditional and
unconditional transfers (see Figure 1).
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa would fall into
the ‘unconditional’ category on every one of the five
counts; and indeed there are few developing
countries elsewhere in the world that could
convincingly claim to meet a majority of the criteria
for ‘conditional’ transfers. In Africa, for example:
z service delivery in health and education is already
overstretched
z government administrative capacity is generally
weak, such that imposing conditionalities will
inevitably divert precious resources from the core
objectives of delivering welfare transfers on the
one hand, and health and education services on
the other
z many of the poor and vulnerable find access to
limited health and education services difficult and
expensive (even when officially ‘free’):
conditionalities will drain their household
resources as they seek to comply, but they will
receive little in return
z because labour is abundant, and work
opportunities scarce, there is little incentive for
child employment, and school enrolment is
already high (especially in countries where primary
education is free)
z numbers in formal employment are very low –
typically no more than 20 per cent of the
workforce.
Conditional schemes are much more complex to
administer than unconditional schemes, and the
monitoring of compliance is near-impossible in many
cases. There is also the consideration that, within
countries, the areas typically inhabited by the most
vulnerable groups are often those where health and
education services are weakest, making them wholly
unsuitable to this kind of approach. Similarly, it is
typically the poorest and most vulnerable who will
find it most costly to comply with any
conditionalities, and are therefore the most likely to
be deprived of benefits if they fail to do so – not the
optimal model for a social protection programme. As
the Most Reverend Desmond Tutu, Archbishop
Emeritus of Cape Town stated in 2006:
Conditionalities attached to social transfers tend
to prevent the poorest families – the very people
who most desperately need income support –
from accessing grants.’ (Tutu 2006)
6 ‘Morally atrocious’
Finally, leading on from this, it is morally highly
questionable whether a government (often
encouraged by donors) can, on the one hand, proudly
tell its citizens that social protection is their basic
‘human right’; and then, on the other hand, threaten
to deprive the neediest among them of that very
‘right’ if they fail to meet certain ‘conditions’. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed in
1948, states that ‘everyone, as a member of society,
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has the right to social security’ (Art. 22), to ‘social
protection’ (Art. 23), and to ‘security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old
age or other lack of livelihood’ (Art. 25). Many
governments since then have either enshrined a
right to social protection in their constitutions, or
have signed up to grandiose declarations such as the
Livingstone Call for Action, agreed by 13 African
governments in Zambia in 2006, which clearly
accepts that ‘social protection is a basic human right’.
Imagine substituting another such ‘right’, in the
context of conditional cash transfers: what kind of
international outcry would ensue if a government
chose to deprive its citizens of water, or of shelter,
or even of life, if they failed to send their children to
school or attend a health clinic?
The message is clear: CCTs risk becoming the
twenty-first century equivalent of the besmirched
sugar trade!
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Notes
1 World Bank website: www.worldbank.org
2 Chambers 21st Century Dictionary.
3 For example, the oft-cited Oportunidades and
Bolsa Familia programmes in Mexico and Brazil,
respectively.
4 Samson, M. (2006) Presentation to the Third
International Conditional Cash Transfers
Conference, Istanbul. Available at
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/icct06/DOCS/
English/Day2/Samson_CCTconferenceJune27EPR
Izz.pdf
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